This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by de Heus, P. Search for Related Content PubMed Articles by de Heus, P. Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Do Reciprocal Strategies Work in Social Dilemmas?

Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, University of Leiden, The Netherlands

According to computer simulations by Parks and Komorita (1997), group-based reciprocal strategies (GBRS; i.e., strategies in which players cooperate only when a sufficient number of others do) are more effective than the strategy of unconditional defection (ALL-D) in 100-person social dilemmas. In this article, theoretical arguments and a replication of the Parks and Komorita simulations are presented, which demonstrate that when strategies are analyzed at the individual level (at which they were defined), GBRS are actually less effective than ALL-D. The divergence of this conclusion from that of Parks and Komorita is attributed to specific selection factors in design and analysis of the original simulations. However, when the strategies are analyzed as strategies for subgroups rather than individuals, the claim that GBRS are more effcetive than ALL-D finds more support, most notably because players using these and other conditionally cooperative strategies tend to defect when single or in small subgroups but to cooperate when in large subgroups.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 278-288 (2000)
DOI: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0403_5


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?