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Evil Is More Than Banal: Situationism and the Concept of Evil

Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Social psychology as a discipline has given relatively little attention to the problem of evil in society, and those discussions in this field that do exist typically regard evil actions as only varieties of aggression without any characteristics that distinguish them from other forms of intentional mistreatment of others. Because of the field's situationistic perspective emphasizing the individual's susceptibility to the power of the immediate situation, social psychologists generally view the fairly high levels of obedience to authority displayed in Milgram's (1963, 1974) classic experiment as the paradigmatic example of evil behavior. For them, much evil is, in Arendt's (1963) well-known phrase, only "banal," and Milgram's findings are often viewed as illustrating the "central dynamic" involved in the slaughter of millions of Jews and other "undesirables" in the Holocaust. This article holds that Milgram's (1974) obedience research does not represent significant features of the Holocaust, especially the sadism that occurred not infrequently, and disregards the vital difference between those who initiated the murderous policy and the others who followed their orders. Building on Darley's (1992) earlier conjectures about the features that ordinary people might consider in judging whether any given action is evil, I suggest that many persons have a prototypic conception of evil and speculate about the dimensions that could be involved in this prototype.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 246-253 (1999)
DOI: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0303_7


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				J. M. Darley Methods for the Study of Evil-Doing Actions Personality and Social Psychology Review, August 1, 1999; 3(3): 269 - 275. [Abstract] [PDF]