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Reciprocal Strategies for Large Groups

Craig D. Parks

Department of Psychology, Washington State University

Samuel S. Komorita

Department of Psychology, University of Illinois

Reciprocal strategies have been shown to be effective in inducing long-term cooperation in social dilemmas involving small, but not large, groups. In this article, we argue that group-based reciprocal strategies (GBRS)—under which one reciprocates cooperative factions, not individuals, within the group—can induce cooperation in large groups. Results of two computer simulations of 100-member groups show that a GBRS accumulates a significantly larger payoff than do other commonly advocated mixedmotive strategies. A third simulation showed that the size of the cooperative faction is influenced by the nature of the payoff matrix; when there is considerable temptation to defect, one should cooperate only after a large number of others have done so, but if there is little temptation to defect, one should reciprocate the cooperative actions of a smaller faction. We also found that the use of a "win-cooperate, lose-defect" heuristic led to substantial total outcomes. Our results suggest several psychological factors are important in facilitating cooperation, yet need empirical study.

Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, 314-322 (1997)
DOI: 10.1207/s15327957pspr0104_3


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